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A Critical Look at the 'Critical Mass'
Argument
By Dawinder S. Sidhu

The Chronicle of Higher Education
February 18, 2013

Michael Morgenstern for The Chronicle

The Supreme Court's pending ruling in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin is
expected to largely decide how or even whether affirmative action can be used in
college admissions. The university's argument for why minority enrollments need to
reach a certain threshold, however, is problematic because it is inconsistent with
previous court rulings involving race.
Abigail Fisher, a white applicant who was denied acceptance by the institution even
though her grades and test scores were higher than those of other students who
were admitted, is arguing that the university's policy of considering race as a factor
in its decisions is unconstitutional. Whether affirmative action is in fact constitutional
boils down to two separate inquiries: Is there a compelling reason for giving such
preferences, and is there a close fit between the means and that compelling reason?
In terms of the first question—the "why"—the Supreme Court has held that diversity
provides an educational benefit to all students, and so colleges may use racial
preferences in admissions for that purpose. Colleges have argued, and the court has

agreed, that exposure to different backgrounds and perspectives requires people to
defend and even reformulate their respective worldviews, and that diversity enriches
what we think about ourselves and one another.
In terms of the second question—the "how"—the University of Texas argues that it
must enroll a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students for the
educational benefits of diversity to occur.
A critical mass, in this case, is not a fixed percentage or number of students. Instead,
it is defined by the university as the point at which students in underrepresented
minority groups no longer feel isolated or like spokespeople for their races. In the
absence of this critical mass, the argument goes, students in underrepresented
minority groups will feel forced to communicate viewpoints that are characteristic of
their races.
With a critical mass of students of the same race, however, those students will feel
comfortable articulating their individual perspectives and opinions. As a result, they
will break down preconceived notions that members of racial communities share
monolithic or predictable positions.
Inasmuch as diversity is a permissible or desirable objective, the critical-mass
approach gives rise to two concerns, neither of which was sufficiently discussed in
2003 when the Supreme Court's Grutter v. Bollinger decision approved the
University of Michigan Law School's use of the critical-mass theory. With the
University of Texas' affirmative--action policy under review, an opportunity exists for
the merit of those concerns to be considered.
First, critical mass is based on the idea that, if such mass is not achieved, students in
underrepresented minority groups will express representative racial opinions. In
doing so, the critical-mass theory presupposes and reinforces the stereotype that
there are such shared or common racial viewpoints that may be demanded of, and
reflexively articulated by, an underrepresented minority.
The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the "offensive and demeaning
assumption" that individuals of a given race "think alike." For example, in the context
of voting, the court dismissed the suggestion that members of a particular race
possess the same "political interests" or the same favorite "candidates at the polls."
It may be countered that the University of Texas does not hold those stereotypes but
instead is attempting to challenge racial stereotypes potentially held by other
students. But a telling example cuts against that saving argument. Counsel for Texas
told the Supreme Court that the university wants to admit "individuals who will play
against racial stereotypes," such as "the African-American fencer" or "the Hispanic ...
who has mastered classical Greek."
Those examples indicate that the university is itself constructing or affirming
privately held stereotypes—that African-American students are not fencers and that
Hispanics cannot master classical Greek—which the university then claims it must
dismantle. For Texas to seek to validate those stereotypes seems inconsistent with

the Supreme Court's pronouncement that "private biases may be outside the reach
of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."
Second, the critical-mass theory implies that, without an adequate presence of
members of the same race, underrepresented minority students are categorically
incapable of articulating themselves as individuals. As a federal appeals court
pointed out, it "assumes that students cannot function or express themselves unless
they are surrounded by a sufficient number of persons of like race or ethnicity."
To be sure, it may not be easy for some minority students to convey certain
viewpoints in the face of internally or externally imposed expectations. Members of
the same race also may affirmatively provide support that facilitates free and candid
expression. In the eyes of the law, however, no race should be construed as having a
set of default viewpoints or as being effectively unable to be individuals in
educational conversations.
The critical-mass theory, therefore, may actually validate racial stereotypes and
perpetuate notions of racial inadequacy. If the court finds that it does, then colleges
trying to create a diverse student body may be forced to find alternative means to
meet that compelling and worthy goal.
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